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Abstract 
The impact of banking relationships on SME credit rationing has been widely discussed in the literature, although the analysis of 
guarantee rationing has perhaps received the least attention. In our opinion, this analysis should adopt a multi-dimensional focus 
instead of being treated separately as in previous studies. To this end, this rationing is quantified in aggregated form, through the 
degree of guarantee rationing. The banking relationship characteristics of SMEs in Spain that affect this phenomenon are 
analyzed empirically applying Multiple Linear Regression. The recommendations to the SME about their connection with the 
banking entity to bear a lesser degree of guarantee rationing, it is to keep fewer banking relationships and a higher trust level with 
the financial institutions. 
Keywords: Guarantee rationing, number of banking relationships, duration of banking relationship, SME;  
1. Introduction 
The banking relationship literature views the credit rationing as one of the principal problems facing SMEs, and 
one of its causes is the existence of asymmetric information between the participants in the relationship (Stiglitz & 
Weiss (1981)). In this context, the banking relationship is deemed to be a connection between the banking entity and 
a particular customer that enables an increase in information flow and trust between both parties. In others words, 
consolidation of the banking relationship between an SME and a banking entity appears to be an ideal vehicle for 
both parties to increase mutual information, reducing information asymmetries and thus contributing to less credit 
rationing. 
Although the impact of the banking relationship on SME credit rationing has been widely analyzed in the 
literature, guarantee rationing has perhaps received the least attention of all. In addition, in previous empirical 
studies different measures for guarantee rationing have been used in each case, individually, considering them with 
sufficiently differentiated nuances of the same concept. In this work, guarantee rationing is treated as a 
heterogeneous reality and, in accordance; a multi-dimensional focus will be adopted, integrating it in the degree of 
guarantee rationing.  
The aim of this work is to identify the behaviors associated with the connection of an SME with a banking entity 
that bring a lesser degree of guarantee rationing. This being the objective, in first place, there is a review of studies 
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associated with guarantee rationing and the banking relationship. Then, an empirical study is performed regarding 
SMEs in Spain to analyze the characteristics of the banking relationship that affect the degree of guarantee rationing. 
And, lastly, the main conclusions are drawn from the analysis made, comparing the results with the work just cited.  
2. Guarantee rationing and banking relationship 
In the conclusions of researches into the impact of the banking relationship on guarantee rationing divergence is 
evident, which may be due to different reasons, in relation, for example, to the characteristics of the setting in which 
the banking relationship analyzed takes place and/or those associated with the type of measure used for guarantee 
rationing and the research methodology used in each case. However, in the main a negative relation is discerned 
with the duration of the banking relationship, while there is less consensus in the results or conclusions regarding the 
number of banking relationships and trust level, as can be appreciated in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Results of empirical studies into the impact of the banking relationship on guarantee rationing 
 
VARIABLES RESULTS 
Number of banking 
relationships 
Positive relation: Harhoff & Körting (1998); Ziane (2004) 
Negative relation: Machauer & Weber (1998);  Machauer & Weber  (2000); Brau (2002); Voordeckers 
& Steijvers (2006) 
Non-significant relation: Hernández & Martínez (2006) 
Duration Positive relation: Hernández y Martínez (2006) 
Negative relation: Berger & Udell (1995); Harhoff & Körting (1998); Degryse & Van Cayseele (2000); 
Lehmann & Neuberger (2001); Bodenhorn (2003); Chakraborty & Hu (2006); Voordeckers & Steijvers 
(2006) 
Non-significant relation: Machauer & Weber (1998); Brau (2002); Cardone et al. (2005); Hernández & 
Martínez (2010) 
Trust level Positive relation: Hernández & Martínez (2010) 
Negative relation: Harhoff & Körting (1998) 
Non-significant relation: Lehmann & Neuberger (2001) 
3. Empirical Study 
3.1. Population and information collection method 
The population is constituted by Spanish SMEs that, on one hand, in terms of sector of activity, do not belong to 
the financial intermediation and business services sector, which is usually omitted due to its relation with the subject 
under analysis in this study; and that, on the other, in terms of business size, have ten or more employees, excluding 
micro-enterprises. Via the stratified random sampling, a sample of 700 Spanish SMEs was obtained, with a margin 
of error of +/- 3.7% for a trust level of 95%.  
The information needed for the research was obtained by holding a telephone survey during the months of April 
and June 2011 with those directly in charge of banking relationships in SMEs. For this purpose, through the 
literature review, a questionnaire was drawn up.  
3.2. Variables 
The variables for banking relationship characteristics that will be considered in the empirical study derive from 
the variables employed in the different previous studies, as follows: the number of banking entities with which the 
SME works (N); the duration of the banking relationship with the main institution, in years (D); and the mutual trust 
level perceived by the SME, measured by means of a Likert scale with a range of values of one (none) to five (a lot) 
for the mutual trust perceived by the enterprise (TRUST). 
Guarantee rationing being a heterogeneous reality, various variables will be used jointly to measure it to enable a 
more real and complete approach. In concrete terms, an additive variable will be created as the sum of three 
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descriptive variables, thereby attaining the concept for the degree of guarantee rationing (RAGA). These variables 
were selected through the application of data mining techniques, in the specific form of Bayesian network 
multivariate learning algorithms, between the variables used in previous studies. So, the following variables will be 
included: the first refers to a banking entity’s request for guarantees when funding is applied for (RAGAa), that is, a 
dichotomous variable with a value of one if the response to the request for guarantees is affirmative and zero if it is 
negative; the second captures the frequency with which the banking entity asks the SME to provide personal 
guarantees (RAGAb), that is, a polytomous variable with a value of one to five in accordance with whether the 
enterprise provides personal guarantees with less (1) or more (5) frequency; and the third refers to the request for 
compensation for the latest credit granted (RAGAc), that is, a dichotomous variable with a value of one if the 
response to the request for complementary financial services affirmative and zero if it is negative. In addition, before 
adding these variables, a process of standardization to a common scale of (0.1) took place, as they were initially 
measured using Likert scales with different ranges. 
4. Methodology 
Examining banking relationship characteristics carries out analysis of the degree of guarantee rationing. To do so, 
Multiple Linear Regression is used, via the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator. Specifically, the stepwise 
forward procedure will be applied using the criterion of significance based on the probability of F, so that the 
variables included in the model will per se possess significant coefficients, with a level of significance that is 
registered in the corresponding table. 
To evaluate the goodness of fit of the model obtained, in addition to the level of significance of the estimations 
arrived at, on the one hand, a combined test of the F statistic is used, permitting analysis of the null hypothesis that 
all the coefficients are equal to zero, excepting that associated with the constant term; and, on the other hand, the 
determination coefficient (multiple R2) is utilized, which expresses the percentage of variance of the dependent 
variable that is explained by the independent variables. 
5. Empirical Results 
In this case, the model that was obtained through application of the regression technique to the sample is 
significant with a determination coefficient of 7.6%, as is reflected in the two last columns of Table 2. The variables 
in the equation include the number of banking relationships, the estimated coefficient (B) being positive, that is, an 
increase in the number of banking relationships implies a higher risk of experiencing guarantee rationing; whilst 
trust level proves significant, with a negative estimated coefficient (B), that is to say, an increase in trust level 
produces lower risk of being subject to guarantee rationing.  
 
Table 2: Variables in the equation: dependent variable RAGA based on banking relationship characteristics 
 
 Non-standardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
t Sig. Confidence interval of 
95% 
R2 Sig. 
B Std. error Beta   Lower 
limit 
Upper limit 
SAMPLE .076 .000 
Constant 1.715 .174  9.835 .000 1.373 2.058 
N .099 .018 .223 5.481 .000 .063 .134 
TRUST -.173 .039 -.182 -4.47 .000 -.249 -.097 
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6. Conclusions  
This study has analyzed the guarantee rationing experienced by SMEs in relation with banking relationship 
characteristics, but considering it in aggregated form, composed, that is, of the different dimensions of the 
heterogeneous reality captured within the concept of guarantee rationing.  
We can appreciate that the variables for the number of banking relationships and trust level prove significant, 
affecting guarantee rationing positively and negatively, in each case. With reference to the number of banking 
relationships, a possible explanation for this positive relation may be found in the present environment as defined by 
the recent financial crisis, which has led to a higher level of mistrust among participants in the financial markets and 
the ensuing credit squeeze (Carbó, 2009; Gallurt, 2011). In this connection, when SMEs work with fewer banking 
entities this may mean that the former share more private information with banking entities, whilst a smaller number 
of banking relationships might produce a less intimate relationship with each of the entities, with less private 
information being shared by the SMEs with these institutions. The closer relationship seems to help alleviate the 
negative consequences of credit constraints, manifested in requests for guarantees, during financial crises.  
When we come to the second variable, trust level, the negative relation between both variables could due to the 
fact that the increase in trust level between the SME and the banking entity may result in an increase in the 
information shared between the parties in the banking relationship, reducing problems stemming from asymmetric 
information. 
Lastly, the variable for duration is not significant in this case. A possible reason for the non-significance of this 
variable may reside in the fact that, in the present environment defined by the recent financial crisis, owing to the 
increase in uncertainty and the reigning mistrust among the participants in the financial system, long-lasting 
relationships cease to be significant for banking entities when determining the conditions for granting funding to 
SMEs..  
Summing up in the light of the results of this study, if SMEs are to experience less guarantee rationing, in general 
they are recommended to engage in fewer banking relationships, which should be developed seeking the highest 
possible mutual trust level, thereby producing a decrease in such rationing. In other words, maintaining fewer 
banking relationships and fostering a greater trust level will enable SMEs to obtain better access to credit, and 
specifically so where conditions (guarantees) are concerned. 
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